You can find a downloadable version of most of my papers on Philpapers, here
Publications
In English
Books, collections
The subject’s point of view. Oxford University Press 2008
(editor, with Judit Szalai) Special isssue of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy on the emotions, 2006
(author and editor, with Tim Crane) Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press, 2004
Articles, reviews, etc
(2026) (with Yavuz Basoglu) “Privileged access” in Anna Giustina (ed.) The Routledge Handbook on Introspection. Routledge.
(2026) (with Tim Crane) “Lack of Attitude” in: Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (ed.) The nature of belief. Oxford University Press
(2025). “Character Traits and the Mark of the Mental”. In: Voltolini, A. (ed.) Marking the Mark of the Mental. Synthese Library, vol 511. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-98439-6_12
(2025) “The Unity of Knowledge” in Lucy Campbell (ed.) Forms of Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 40-55. 2025
(2023). “The Lives of Others”. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):104-121. DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akad009
(2022) (with Tim Crane) “Mental fact and mental fiction” in Tamas Demeter, T. Parent and Adam Toon (eds.): Mental fictionalism London: Routledge: 303-319
(2022) (with Tim Crane) “The Limits of the Doxastic” in Uriah Kriegel (ed.) Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 2 Oxford University Press: 36-57 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192856685.003.0002
(2021). Knowing a person. In Suki Finn (ed.), Women of Ideas. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-194.
(2021) “Closing (or at least narrowing) the explanatory gap” in Peter Anstey and David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.) Armstrong’s Materialist Theory of the Mind. Oxford University Press: 125-142 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.003.0009
(2019) „Objectual knowledge“ in Jonathan Knowles - Thomas Raleigh (eds.) New Essays on Acquaintance. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-276
(2019) “Extended mental features” in Matteo Colombo, Liz Irvine, Mog Stapleton (eds.) Clark and his critics. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-55
(2018). “The Boundaries of the Mind”. In Amy Kind, Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 256-279.
(2018) “Know-how and non-propositional intentionality” in M. Montague, A. Grzankowski (eds). Non-propositional intentionality, Oxford University Press: 95-113 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0004
(2017) “Practical Know-Wh”. Noûs, 51: 855–870. doi:10.1111/nous.12152
(2016) “Know-wh does not reduce to know-that” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53/2: 109-122
“Belief may not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge” Erkenntnis, 2015, (vol. 80), pp. 185-200
(with Tomasz Budek) “Which causes of an experience are also objects of an experience?” in Berit Broogard (ed.) The Content of Perception, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 351-370
“A sense of reality” in Fiona Macpherson (ed.) Hallucinations MIT Press. 2013 pp. 399-416
“Constructing a world for the senses” in Uriah Kriegel(ed.) Phenomenal Intentionality. New Essays. Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 99-115
“Two versions of the Extended Mind thesis” Philosophia 2012, 40/3, pp 435-447
“Independent intentional objects” in: Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek , Olga Poller, Jan Wolenski (eds.) The Analytical Way. Proceedings of the 6th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, College Publications. 2010: 149-165
“Review of The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perpetual Consciousness and Critical Realism by Paul Coates”. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010):197-201.
“Not all feelings are intentional” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 5/2, 2009: pp. 27-40
„Externalism“. in Louise Cummings (ed.) The Routledge Pragmatics Encyclopedia. Routledge 2009.
„Review of Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers by Laird Addis“ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008.08.17
“Phenomenal Intentionality without Compromise” Monist 91 (2008): 273-293
“Time, tense, truth” Synthese, 160/2 (2008): 269-84
“Indiscriminability and the phenomenal sorites” in Explanatory Gap (In Memory of Nikola Grahek), ed. by M. Arsenijevic and Z. Lazovic, University of Belgrade, 2007.
“Semantic Internalism and Externalism” in: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, ed. by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith, Oxford University Press 2006: 323-40
“Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVI (2006), 205-25
“Is the whole world thinkable?” in: János Boros (ed.) Mind in World: Essays on John McDowell's Mind and World (with John McDowell’s replies). Pécs: Brambauer 2005:135-41
“The unity of Descartes’s thought” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22/1 (January 2005): 17-30
“What is Externalism? ” Philosophical Studies 112/3 (February 2003): 187-208
“Review of The Threefold Cord by Hilary Putnam” Mind 112/448 (October 2003): 786-9
“Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? ” Croatian Journal of Philosophy III/8 (2003): 155-69
“Relativism and the Wittgensteinian Picture of Language” in: K.S. Johannessen - T. Nordenstam (eds.):Culture and Value. (Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium) Kirchberg am Wechsel 1995:15-19
Other
Books, collections
(editor, with Ferenc Huoranszki) Modern metafizikai tanulmányok (Modern studies in metaphysics, Hungarian) Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó, 2004
(editor, with Imre Orthmayr), Bölcselet és Analízis. (Philosophy and Analysis, Hungarian) Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó 2003
(author, with János Kelemen) Nyelvfilozófia (Philosophy of Language, Hungarian) Budapest, Áron Kiadó 2002
Articles, reviews
“Descartes és az emberi elme természete” Korunk XXX/8 (2019 augusztus), 9-11
“Az észlelési tapasztalat” („Perceptual experience“, Hungarian) Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 2012/1, 67-83
“Válasz Forrai Gábornak, Márton Miklósnak és Tőzsér Jánosnak” („Replies“ Hungarian). Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 2010.
(with János Kelemen): “Nyelvfilozófia“ (“Philosophy of Language”, Hungarian) in: Boros Gábor (ed.) Filozófia Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007: 1273-88
“Ismeretség és leírás” (“Acquaintance and description”, Hungarian) in Világosság 2005/12: 53-60
“O Sentido Determina a Referência” (“Sense determines reference”, Portuguese) in The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the conference Mind and Action III Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri 2005: 389-97
“»Sajátos és eredeti módon«. Frege az indexikus kifejezésekről” („Frege on indexicals”, Hungarian) in Katalin Neumer and János Laki (eds.) Minden filozófia „nyelvkritika” II. Analitikus filozófia és fenomenológia Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó 2004
“Tartalom és jelölet” ("Content and reference”, Hungarian) in Farkas-Orthmayr (szerk.) Bölcselet és Analízis. Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó 2003
“A név nem kötelez” (“Names don’t bind”, Hungarian) Café Bábel, 42 (2001/4): 67-71
"Tőzsér János könyvérõl" (Review of János Tőzsér's book”, Hungarian) Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 45 /3 (2001): 431-38
"Néhány megjegyzés az externalista elméletek értelmezéséről” ("Some remarks on interpreting externalist theories”, Hungarian) Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 45/1-2 (2001): 35-43
"A tárgyak megnevezése: az ágostoni nyelvkép kritikája a Vizsgálódásokban” ("Words name objects: the criticism of the Augustinian picture of language in the Investigations” Hungarian) Világosság XLII/2-3 (2001): 39-46
“Szkepticizmus és filozófiai gondolkodás” (“Skepticism and Philosophical Thinking”, Hungarian) Világosság XLI/4 (2000): 59-78
“A szkepticizmus kihívása", könyvkritika (“The Challenge of Skepticism”, book review, Hungarian) BUKSZ, 1998 winter
“Egy nagyon globális szkepticizmus” (“A Very Global Skepticism”, Hungarian) Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 1998
“Lehetséges-e feminista ismeretelmélet? ” (“Is Feminist Epistemology Possible?”, Hungarian) Világosság 1997
“Externalizmus és önismeret” (“Externalism and Self-Knowledge”, Hungarian) in: Kukla Krisztián - Sutyák Tibor (szerk.) Kitolási szakasz (Fiatal filozófusok antológiája) Balassi Kiadó 1997: 238-48
“A konceptuális sémák érdemeiről és fogyatékosságairól” (“On the Merits and Shortcomings of Conceptual Schemes”, Hungarian) Világosság 1995
“De wereld interpreteren” (“To Interpret the World”, Dutch) Krisis 1995 (Amsterdam)